for LCDR [illegible]

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
TASK GROUP 7.3
APO 187 (HDQ), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

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SUBJECT: Historical Installment Number 2: submission of

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TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HDQ), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to CJTF SEVEN letter S3S/314.7 of 9 Oct 1953, serial 0-7467 and CJTF SEVEN Standing Operating Procedure Number 172-701.

2. Commander Task Group 7.3 Installment Number 2 of the History of Operation CASTLE is submitted.

H. C. BINTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander

1 Incl
Historical
Installment No. 2

Copies furnished:
CTG 7.1
CTG 7.2
CTG 7.4
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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.3

HISTORY OF OPERATION CASTLE

INSTALLMENT NUMBER 2

Period ending 24 January 1954

Submitted:

R. F. MADDEN
Lieutenant Commander, USNR-R

Approved
10 February 1954:

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Task Group 7.3

This document consists of 38 page(s)
No. 6 of 9 copies

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OUTLINE

I. Preparation

II. Deployment

III. Problems encountered and their solutions, in the following order:

  a. Administrative

  b. Security

  c. Operational

  d. Logistical

  e. Communications

  f. Comptroller

IV. Pertinent statistical material

[redacted]

I

PREPARATION

1. The Navy Task Group's overall operation plan for CASTLE was published on 7 December 1953.[1] It summarized the mission assigned the Navy in this test series, set forth the organization that would carry it out and laid out their assigned tasks. The basic mission was essentially unchanged from that outlined earlier; the organization had been modified and somewhat expanded; the tasks had grown more numerous and more complex, as the various scientific projects requiring direct Navy support developed their own plans and made their needs known. It became more and more apparent that the two-atoll concept of operations would add to this complexity.

2. The mission as assigned by CJTF SEVEN still involved, basically, two main responsibilities, for the security of the area, and for the support of scientific projects.[2] The augmented forces recommended by the Task Group Commander had been assigned by CinCPacFlt. This augmentation was small in size, consisting only of two more fighter aircraft (F4U-5N) and an additional ASW vessel (PC 1546). It would nevertheless permit some fighter protection at both atolls, with the capability of scrambling two plane interceptors at both locations, and a reasonable ASW capability on a 24 hour basis in the vicinity of both atolls.

3. In November, 1953, the USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH (T-AP 181) was designated to join the Task Group for a part of CASTLE, primarily to

1. CTG 7.3 Operation Plan Number 1-53
2. CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53, pp 3-4 and Annex HOW

[redacted]

augment the evacuation capability at BIKINI. Two LST's, the 825 and the 1146, were directed to be ready to relieve the LST's already assigned, in the event of a serious breakdown. One, the LST 825, was ordered into the Operation in January 1954 to replace the 551 which was forced to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs. A barge, YC-1081, was assigned to support Project 1.4, following completion of tests conducted in Chesapeake Bay in October 1954. Early in January, 1954 the Task Group staff learned of the probable approval of a new project sponsored by the Bureau of Ordnance that was likely to add to the Task Group USS SHEA (DM-30), USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42), LST 1172, small craft, and personnel of Naval Beach Group ONE and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit ONE. The units to be employed in CASTLE will be considerably greater in number and more diverse in type than those employed in IVY.

4. In October 1953 Rear Admiral Bruton participated in the Task Force Commander's presentation of CASTLE plans to CinCPac and members of CinCPac and CinCPacFlt staffs. At this time he and his Plans and Operations Officer, Commander M. S. Schmidling, U.S.N., conferred with members of CinCPacFlt staff at Pearl Harbor, with a first draft of CTG 7.3 Operation Plan Number 1-53 as the basis for discussion. Upon completion of this series of conferences and the return of the party to Washington headquarters, revision and refinement of theplan went forward with an early December 1953 production date the target.

5. At the same time preparations were continued by the various units scheduled to participate in CASTLE. The procurement, installation and operational testing of special equipment, the procurement and training of specialized personnel, the indoctrination of ships' and aircraft crews in radiological safety and in security measures, and the never-ending job of obtaining necessary security clearances were accomplished concurrently with units' employment in routine operations. The Task Group staff, in addition to its planning task, was occupied in coordinating these diverse preparations, and in expediting the procurement, delivery and installation of needed items on less than normal notice. Numerous staff visits were made to West Coast and Hawaiian commands as well as to the forward area.

6. In October 1953, CJTF SEVEN, after coordinating the requirements of TG 7.1 with the capabilities of TG 7.3, recommended to CinCPacFlt a tentative schedule for the movement of CASTLE units to the forward area.[3] In late November 1953, after various revisions and readjustments of this schedule, CTG 7.3 forwarded to CinCPacFlt a request for the forward movement of all units, indicating desired movement dates, routings, destinations, and dates for change of operational control to CTG 7.3.[4] These recommendations took into consideration a revision in CASTLE shot dates, and in the shot schedule. This revision, involving a two weeks' delay, regardless of other consequences, had a beneficial effect on Navy morale, in that it assured several ships' companies the opportunity to spend the Christmas holidays at home.

3. CJTF SEVEN ltr J-3/565.1 of 2 Oct 1953 ser 07253.
4. CTG 7.3 ltr A4-3 ser 00113 of 20 Nov 1953.

7. At the end of November 1953, the Navy Task Group Commander introduced the question of the early release of naval units after the last shot, to permit their prompt return to other scheduled operations.[5] CJTF SEVEN indicated in reply that the planned complete roll-up of all activities at BIKINI would probably require the retention of the Navy Boat Pool there for thirty days after the last shot and of BAIROKO with her helicopters for half of this period. Other vessels, except small craft for CTG 7.2 boat operations at ENIWETOK, would probably be released soon after the last shot.[6]

8. In December 1953, with the distribution of CTG 7.3 Secret Operation Plan Number 1-53, there occurred what could have been a serious compromise of plans for CASTLE. A package containing five copies of the plan reached USS CURTISS by U.S. registered mail with its wrappings in badly damaged condition. Investigations were ordered by CTG 7.3 in Washington, by Commander, Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet in San Diego, and by the Post Office Department. It was concluded that the damage to the wrapping was not the result of tampering, and that it was highly unlikely that any compromise had occurred.[7]

5. CTG 7.3 ltr A4-3 ser 001186 of 30 Nov 1953.
6. CJTF SEVEN ltr J-3/3004 of 14 Dec 1953 ser 08988.
7. Investigative report of 8 Jan 1954 with CTG 7.3 1st. End, file A-17 ser 0056 of 23 January 1954

II

DEPLOYMENT

1. In December 1953, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet approved the recommendation for the forward movement of CASTLE units, and directed type commanders to implement it. The movement began somewhat inauspiciously with the sailing of LST 551 (LT E. G. Kanzenback, USN) from Pearl Harbor 13 December 1953, for BIKINI via MAJURO, KUSAIE, PONAPE, ENIWETOK and RONGERIK to establish weather stations. At BIKINI she was to join LST 762 (LT J. O. Bachert, USN), already on the scene, in the inter-atoll lift. At RONGERIK, however, on 10 January 1954, she sustained severe hull damage in beaching and returned to ENIWETOK where inspection revealed that it would be necessary for her to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs. CTG 7.3 requested Commander, Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet to order up a replacement LST.

Commencing in early January 1954, other movements followed in quick succession:

2 January - USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) (CDR R. K. Cockey, USN) sailed from San Diego with the major part of the Navy Boat Pool embarked, and arrived at BIKINI 19 January. There she offloaded 3 LCU's and 3 LCM's, plus part of the Boat Pool detachment. She then proceeded to ENIWETOK, arriving 20 January, and loaded the advance Boat Pool detachment and 15 LCM's. Returning to BIKINI on 21 January she placed the TG 7.3 Boat Pool in operation.

2 January - USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114) (LT R. A. Mowrer, USN) departed Pearl Harbor with YCV-9 (helicopter landing barge) and YFN 934 (covered lighter for Boat Pool) in tow, arriving at BIKINI 13 January. She moored the YFN at a place convenient for the Boat Pool, and took

the YCV to the general area of shot number two.

4 January - USS APACHE (ATF-67) (LT T. A. Casey, USN) sailed from Subic Bay and is scheduled to arrive at BIKINI 30 January.

5 January - Patrol Squadron 29 (CDR W. Arnold, USN) departed its base at Whidbey Island, Washington, and completed deployment to KWAJALEIN 14 January. VP-29 provided air cover for CURTISS as she approached within 500 miles of ENIWETOK.

5 January - USS PC 1546 (LT B. B. Garlinghouse, USN) sailed from Pearl Harbor, but experienced an engineering breakdown and put in at Johnston Island for repairs. Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet made USS PC 1172, based at KWAJALEIN, available as a temporary replacement, and the 1172 was ordered to ENIWETOK. She arrived there 22 January and assumed the 1546's duties pending completion of repairs.

9 January - USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) (CAPT E. O'Beirne, USN) sailed from San Diego with Task Group 7.4 sampler aircraft (F-84's), L-23's, 12 HRS-2 (helicopters) of HMR 362, 6 F4U-5N (fighter aircraft) of VC-3 and the AUW detail of VP-29 on board. She stopped at KWAJALEIN on 21 January to offload the AUW detail, with its mark 34 mines, and sailed for ENIWETOK via BIKINI. As she passed near BIKINI she flew off 6 HRS-2. She arrived ENIWETOK 22 January. On 23 January she offloaded 15 F-84's and other gear. She sailed 24 January for BIKINI, arrived there and established the helicopter pool on the following day.

9 January - USS SIOUX (ATF-75) (LT T. B. Hurtt, USN) left San Diego for Pearl Harbor, and sailed from Pearl Harbor 17 January with

her arrival at BIKINI scheduled for 25 January.

9 January - YAG -39 (LCDR H. W. Ancell, Jr. USN), and YAG -40 (LCDR J. S. Mafayter, USN) sailed from San Francisco in company with USS MOLALA (ATF-106) (LT R. F. Reed, USN) with CTU 7.3.6 (CAPT G. G. Molumphy, USN) as OTC, in YAG-40, arriving Pearl Harbor 18 January where they were scheduled for five days availability prior to departure for BIKINI.

10 January - USS CURTISS (AV-4) (CAPT R.E.C. Jones, USN), after loading ADC cargo, sailed from Port Chicago, California, with CTG 7.3 (RADM H. C. Bruton) embarked as OTC. The movement was conducted under radio silence, with ships darkened at night, on a route away from normal ocean traffic. She was escorted from San Francisco by Destroyer Division 172, composed of USS TWINING (DD-540), USS COLOHAN (DD-658), USS SHIELDS (DD-596) and USS ERBEN (DD-631). Air cover was provided during periods when the formation was within 500 miles of San Francisco, Hawaii and Eniwetok. Off Hawaii, CURTISS was refueled by USS MISPILLION (AO-105), and DesDiv 172 was relieved as escort by Escort Destroyer Division 12 (CAPT J. E. Smith, USN). This is the CASTLE Escort Destroyer Division, consisting of USS EMERSON (DDE-719) (CDR N. B. Davis, Jr., USN), USS PHILIP (DDE-498) (CDR G. W. Albin, Jr. USN), USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449) (CDR J. C. Eliot, USN) and USS RENSHAW (DDE-499) (CDR L. H. Alford, USN). MISPILLION joined the Task Group enroute to ENIWETOK. Each destroyer type was refueled once from CURTISS or MISPILLION during the passage. CURTISS arrived at

ENIWETOK 24 January, and CTG 7.3 moved to his headquarters ashore on PARRY Island.

18 January - USS ESTES (AGC-12) (CAPT J. W. Waterhouse, USN) departed San Diego, with her arrival at ENIWETOK scheduled for 3 February, after a two day stop over at Pearl Harbor.

20 January - USS LST 825 (LT K. W. Laughlin, USN) sailed from San Diego as relief for LST 551.

2. Prior to embarking in CURTISS at Fort Chicago, CTG 7.3 closed his Washington, D.C. headquarters on 8 January 1954, travelling by air to NAS Alameda accompanied by a part of his staff. During the passage of the CURTISS, CAPT R. Rutherford, USN, Chief of Staff, in his capacity as CTG 7.3 Administration, proceeded to ENIWETOK by air, accompanied by the remainder of the staff. Upon arrival there he established the staff headquarters and communication station on PARRY Island and commenced operations. On 14 January 1954, CTG 7.3 (ADMIN) assumed operational control of LST 762, YOG-61, YO-120, and YOG(N)-82 at ENIWETOK, the LST 551 at RONGERIK, CGC BUTTONWOOD (WAGL-306) at BIKINI and VP-29 at KWAJALEIN.

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III

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

a. ADMINISTRATIVE

PROJECT 6.4 PERSONNEL

1. Project 6.4, involving the testing of ships' water spray equipment for protection against radioactive fallout, presented certain administrative problems. As a scientific project sponsored by the Department of Defense it forms a part of Task Unit 13 of Task Group 7.1. At the same time the project's two ships, YAG 39 and YAG 40, Liberty type hulls reactivated for Operation CASTLE from the Maritime Service reserve fleet, are Navy-manned, each under an Officer-in-Charge, and as naval vessels, are a part of Task Group 7.3. In the forward area they are under the operational control of CTG 7.3. Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, is the type commander. The project is sponsored by the Navy Bureau of Ships; the Project Officer is CAPT G. C. Malumphy, USN, of that Bureau.

2. Since two Task Groups are directly involved, it was necessary that agreement be reached on the administrative responsibilities of each. The following agreements and understandings were reached:

a. Officers and men of the YAG crews are part of Task Group 7.3 at all times, just as are their ships. The Project Officer is ordered by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to additional duty under the operational control of CTG 7.3. He has been designated within the Task Group 7.3 task organization as Commander, Task Unit 7.3.6. Health, service and pay records will be retained in the ships. Personnel accounting will be by the type commander. When ships'

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company personnel are required ashore, CTG 7.3 will either issue TAD orders or authorize the Project Officer to issue them. Billets which they will occupy ashore will be considered CTG 7.3 billets.

b. CTG 7.1 will be responsible for the administration and billeting of other project personnel, military or civilian, including the Project Officer.

c. Since the YAG Officers-in-Charge do not have authority to convene special courts-martial without express authorization by the Secretary of the Navy, CTG 7.3 has requested such authorization be made, and it is expected this request will be granted.

d. Officers-in-Charge of the YAG's will handle emergency leave just as would the Commanding Officers of any Task Group Units.

e. As regards security clearances, requests for National Agency Checks will be forwarded from the YAG's directly to the Office of Naval Intelligence; applications for "Q" clearances will be forwarded to CINCPAC via the Project Officer and CTG 7.3. Officers-in-Charge will grant military security clearances in accordance with the U.S. Navy Security Manual, OpNav Instruction 5510.1

f. Security training and indoctrination of YAG personnel is a CTG 7.3 responsibility, exercised through the Officer-in-Charge, with reports submitted by them via the Project Officer.

III

b. SECURITY

1. The security indoctrination and training program prescribed by CJTF SEVEN was instituted in October in all units then designated for the Task Group, and in additional units as they were nominated. Upon the arrival of CTG 7.3 in the forward area, all ships and units then in the area, without exception, reported full compliance with the requirements of CJTF SEVEN Security Memoranda Numbers 2 and 3. No difficulties are anticipated from units which have not yet arrived.

2. Similar success cannot be claimed for the clearance program. The units nominated for CASTLE at an early date have their "Q" clearances and National Agency Checks substantially completed and present no problem, other than the routine one of badging the required personnel after their arrival at ENIWETOK or BIKINI. Units assigned later, however, have not had sufficient time to obtain all desired "Q" clearances. Some of them have already arrived in the area. As an interim measure, to permit necessary personnel to enter restricted areas and carry out their planned tasks, it will be necessary to grant interim Top Secret clearances to those who are considered eligible for them, and badge them on this basis pending receipt of their "Q" clearances.

3. The Bureau of Ordnance project which will bring USS SHEA, USS RECLAIMER, and other units into the Task Group will present an extreme example of the clearance problem. To date no clearance

applications for personnel of those units have even been received in staff headquarters, and it is likely that Operation CASTLE will have been completed before more than a token number, if any, of their "Q" clearances have been granted.

c. OPERATIONAL

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

1. Upon approval of CTG 7.3's request to the Chief of Naval Operations for wire-dragging BIKINI channels and operating basins, Mine Division 74, USS CHIEF (AM-315) and USS COMPETENT (AM-316), was diverted to BIKINI enroute WestPac to accomplish the task. Hydrographic Office technicians travelled to the forward area to assist. MinDiv 74 completed the wire-dragging operations, marked the channel with dan buoys, and departed for WestPac on 6 November 1953. The Hydrographic Office technicians and the AEC representative at ENIWETOK reported that the wire-dragging had revealed previously unknown shoals whose location made the channels as then buoyed hazardous for ships of 30 foot draft. They recommended that some of the permanent buoys then in place be moved to new locations, and that additional permanent buoys be installed to replace the dan buoys laid by MinDiv 74.[8] Since USS GYPSY, which had been employed in overhauling mooring buoys in the area, was required to depart for her base at Pearl Harbor by 10 December 1953, and in any event could not do the job without considerable assistance from the AEC contractor at BIKINI, which he was not in a position to give, the U.S. Coast Guard was requested to install and move the necessary buoys.[9] The Cutter BUTTONWOOD (WAGL-306) proceeded to BIKINI, and, between 10 and 20 January 1954, planted eight new buoys and moved six to mark the wire-dragged channel, checked

8. USAEC ENIWETOK Dispatch 230710Z of Nov 53 cite RENG 1060
9. USAEC ENIWETOK Dispatch 230615Z of Nov 53 cite RENG 1059

other channel buoys for proper operation, and installed telephone type mooring buoy "TZ" as well.[10] On 22 and 23 January 1954, she checked all buoys and lights in ENIWETOK Lagoon, repairing and retiming them as necessary. She re-established the 4½ fathom obstruction buoy in the seadrome area, and departed for KWAJALEIN late on 23 January 1954.

2. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard had reported in October 1953, the completion of the original buoyage system requested and provided to CTG 7.3 information concerning the candlepower and characteristics of the lighted aids installed. This information was passed to the Hydrographer who issued a specially corrected chart of BIKINI Atoll which was distributed to CASTLE participants. The changes and additions accomplished by BUTTONWOOD in January 1954, were published to Task Group ships from PARRY Island headquarters.

3. In December 1953, having learned that the removal of several hydrographic survey towers and others left on BIKINI from Operation CROSSROADS was planned, CTG 7.3 requested that certain towers, 13 in number, be retained in place to serve as landmarks for use in ship navigation at the atoll.[11]

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10. CTG BUTTONWOOD ltr ser: 00689 of 20 Jan 1954
11. CTG 7.3 ltr H-2 ser: 001359 of 21 Dec 53 with CJTF SEVEN First End.

III

MOORING BUOYS

4. The overhaul of mooring buoys at BIKINI and ENIWETOK was begun by USS GYPSY (ARSD-1) in September 1953. In general she was to lift, inspect, and replant buoys scheduled for use at ENIWETOK, and to plant three large ship, telephone type, mooring buoys at BIKINI. Holmes and Narver, the AEC contractor, was to furnish assistance in the form of cranes and barges, and repair and sandblast the lifted moorings prior to re-planting.

5. The task proved to be difficult and GYPSY's progress was slow. The support furnished GYPSY by Holmes and Narver Marine Department was necessarily intermittent because the contractor often had to pull his equipment away from the buoy task in order to offload stores ships. The sandblasting of chain and buoys was slowed up by the necessary use of the soft coral sand available locally.

6. To meet the allotted deadline for the job, Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet Ordered USS ELDER (AN-20) to assist GYPSY. She went to work on 3 October 1953. The two ships finally completed the job by early December 1953, with the exception of buoy "TZ" off ENJUMAK Island, which was later planted by CGC BUTTONWOOD.

7. The major buoys planted, in good condition, were:

a. At ENIWETOK: Buoy L-2, telephone type buoy M-3, the AVE and YO buoys, and the POL buoy off ENIWETOK Island; telephone type buoy B-1, buoys B-3 and C-3, and the POL buoy off PARRY Island.

b. At BIKINI: Buoys TX, TY and TZ.

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III

SMALL CRAFT MODIFICATIONS

8. Small craft modifications requested during the planning phase of the operation, to craft designated for support of scientific projects, were completed, as follows:

a. Project 1.6 - LCM modified by addition of a wooden platform deck and covered working space, davits for small boats used in shallow water diving, a stern anchor, and a portable fathometer.

b. Project 1.4 - LCM modified by addition of a partial wood deck. Project personnel have requested installation of additional decking, a guard rail, and a small crane which the project will provide. These installations will be made by Boat Pool personnel.

c. Project 3.2 - LCU 1348 modified by installation of a portable fathometer, a gyro-compass with three repeaters and a taut wire sounding reel.

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III

BARGE TRANSPORTATION BY LSD

9. A vital task assigned USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) in CASTLE, is the inter-atoll transportation of special device barges. Comparison of the dimensions of the barges with those of the LSD well-deck indicated that the barges could be loaded singly provided a portion of the LSD super-deck (over the well) were removed.[12] As a result of conferences between representatives of CTG 7.1, CTG 7.3, CTG 7.5 and the Commanding Officer, USS BELLE GROVE, and of a test in San Diego in December 1953, performed with a crane similar to that which will be available in the forward area, it was decided that the after section of the super-deck would be removed and stored in San Diego prior to the ship's departure, that two more sections of the super-deck will be removed in the forward area to permit lifting the barges, and that these sections will then be reinstalled after the last barge movement. This will permit the planned transportation of the barges without decreasing seriously the LSD's carrying capacity during her voyages to and from the forward area.[13]

12 CTG 7.3 ltr S1 ser 01089 of 17 November 1953
13 CTG 7.3 dispatch 311644Z of December 1953

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III

ARSD MODIFICATION

10. Accomplishment of ShipAlt ARSD-45 in USS GYPSY prior to CASTLE was considered highly desirable. This alteration would greatly improve her lifting capability, and enable her to support Project 1.4 much more effectively. There was doubt, however, whether GYPSY could complete the overhaul of buoys at ENIWETOK and BIKINI, which she began in September 1953, in time to return to Pearl Harbor, undergo the alteration, and return to BIKINI by 10 January 1954, her CASTLE reporting date.

11. Several factors combined to permit time for this and other work on GYPSY. USS ELDER (AN-20) was ordered to assist her in the buoy overhaul. GYPSY began to experience difficulties with her main propulsion plant during November 1953, accompanied by excessive vibration when underway over 2/3 speed. The Project 1.4 test conducted in Chesapeake Bay in October 1953, indicated need for a barge in addition to craft already requested for the project, including GYPSY, and YC 1021 was made available. With the presence of the YC barge assured, GYPSY's reporting date for CASTLE was postponed to early February 1954. She completed her buoy overhaul duties and sailed for Pearl Harbor on 3 December 1953. During her period there it was planned to accomplish the ShipAlt, install high pressure tanks to permit her divers to work at depths up to 200 feet, and remedy her main propulsion difficulties.

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III

FALL-OUT COLLECTOR BUOYS

12. At the end of September 1953, tests of equipment which would permit positive identification of fall-out collector buoys of Project 2.5a had been unsatisfactory. The project planned to place the buoys in the area which would be patrolled by surface and air security forces, and CinCPacFlt withheld approval of the plan unless a means of positive identification could be devised. The presence of these radar targets, unidentified, would make the task of the security forces next to impossible to perform. A system was devised involving the installation of low frequency radio transmitters in the buoys, within the frequency range of radio direction finders installed or to be installed in the DDE's, patrol aircraft, the PC, and in the ATF's likely to be employed in Project 2.5a.[14] Tests of this equipment were conducted successfully in early November 1953, the system was approved by CinCPacFlt as meeting his requirements, and manufacture and installation of the gear was commenced.[15] In late December 1953, CTG 7.3 informed CTG 7.1 that two of the three ATF's especially equipped for the project would normally be used in recovery of the buoys, with assistance from security ships and aircraft if necessary, and if practicable without interfering with their primary mission.[16]

14. ComAirPac dispatch 020154Z of October 1953
15. CinCPacFlt dispatch 202205Z of November 1953
16. CTG 7.3 ltr A-1 ser 001393 of 24 December 1953

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III

LST BEACHING

13. LST beaching conditions at BIKINI (ENIDAN Island) have been a problem since June 1953, and have been aggravated to a serious degree in recent months by seasonal weather conditions. The original LST pier on ENIDAN was constructed of wooden pilings, plank faced and filled with coral lumps and aggregate. It extends only 100 feet from the beach line. LST's beach port side to the pier. The normal wind is from the port quarter of a ship alongside or approaching. A channel to the pier, and alongside it, had been blasted out of the coral bottom. It was essentially a narrow trough which allowed only about ten yards clearance to starboard of a beached LST. The starboard side of the channel was a coral shelf. The Commanding Officer of LST 1126, LT John H. Mehus, USN, which was engaged in the inter-atoll lift from December 1952 to July 1953, had expressed considerable concern because of the beaching conditions. In his opinion, if he lost control during his approach, and the wind carried him to starboard, he would strike the coral shelf and probably incur serious damage. In addition, the trough-like channel continually filled with sand carried in by wave action. Before each beaching it was necessary for Holmes and Narver, the AEC contractor (TG 7.5), to remove large amounts of sand from the channel to provide a proper beaching gradient.

14. To remedy the situation Holmes and Narver widened the channel alongside the pier to about 150 feet. While this eliminated the danger of a beaching LST being blown off and gashing its side

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on the coral shelf, it had an entirely unexpected, and detrimental, effect. The wave action now removed the sand, and left the coral bottom substantially bare. It now became necessary for Holmes and Narver to put sand in the channel before each beaching, to provide a cushion and a proper gradient for the LST bottom. Furthermore, the constant water action began to cause the pier to deteriorate. Chunks of coral from the fill began to fall out into the channel alongside the pier, requiring inspection of the bottom by a diver and removal of the coral chunks before each beaching. In late December 1953, a typhoon hit near BIKINI, and the waves and swells were of such proportions that they practically demolished the pier. Approximately half of the fill was washed out into the LST berth. Holmes and Narver undertook repair of the pier, installing new piling and new facing, and dredged out the berth, dumping the material removed back inside the facings as fill. The addition of large quantities of sand, and inspection of the bottom by a diver, remain a necessity prior to each beaching.

15. In spite of the great care exercised in beaching at ENIWMAN, LST 762 has thus far suffered three holes in her hull, into a small diesel fuel tank. While the damage reduces her total fuel capacity by 15%, this is not a vital loss because of the large fuel capacity of the LST type. She has also received punctures in her forefoot, which have been repaired by Holmes and Narver. Her bow has been filled with cement as a precautionary measure. When opportunity permits it is planned to repair her hull punctures by welding an underwater

patch. While there is continuing concern over the hazard faced in each beaching at EINIWETOK, out of operational necessity the beachings are being continued, with the sand fill and diver inspection a prerequisite in each case.[17]

17. LST 762 dispatch 100055Z of Dec 53 (CJTF SEVEN ci e 1660)
LST 762 dispatch 222239Z of Dec 53
CTG 7.2 dispatch 230455Z of Dec 53
Admin ComPhibPac dispatch 232011Z of Dec 53
CTG 7.3 dispatch 301726Z of Dec 53
ComPhibPac dispatch 312011Z of Dec 53
CJTF SEVEN dispatch 042146Z of Jan 54
CTG 7.5 EINIWETOK dispatch 061953Z of Jan 54 Cite REG 1167

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III

U DERWATER DETECTION UNIT

16. The Task Group 7.3 Underwater Detection Unit (LT Bruno Mussetto, USN) arrived at ENIWETOK in early November 1953, to test and, if necessary, repair the ENIWETOK hydrophone installation which had been left in place at the end of Operation IVY. The Unit made an early start because there was considerable doubt that the underwater portion of the installation had survived its period of long exposure, which had been extended due to the postponement of CASTLE. Tests of the circuits made in October 1953, by TG 7.2 Navy Detachment ENIWETOK had confirmed this doubt.

17. Further circuit tests made by UDU personnel indicated the need for lifting the hydrophones and cables for repair and reinstallation. Continual bad weather through the month of November 1953, made recovery of the cables and hydrophones impossible. Sufficient equipment to replace the entire underwater system was procured and shipped to the UDU and a new installation was laid. The shore installation had survive the period since IVY with only slight deterioration, and the full system is now in good operating condition

[redacted]

[redacted]

III

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

18. CinCPacFlt provided 6 F4U-5N aircraft from VC-3, NAS Moffett, California, as interceptor forces for CASTLE. During November 1953, his CASTLE team conducted carrier qualification exercises aboard USS BAIROKO. Following these exercises it was decided to restrict the operation of these aircraft off BAIROKO during CASTLE to the minimum consistent with operational necessity, and, as an alternative, to base the aircraft ashore in the forward area whenever practicable.

19. BAIROKO is equipped with Mark IV arresting gear. The gear is not strong enough to withstand the weight of the F4U-5N aircraft in landing. The high accident rate due to this, coupled with the lack of facilities to conduct field landing carrier practice and frequent carrier qualification exercises in the forward area, made the likelihood of landing damage to one or more of the six assigned aircraft very great, if normal carrier operations were followed. With only six aircraft, and no replacements available, damage to even one would seriously reduce interceptor capabilities during CASTLE. In the forward area, then, fighter aircraft will be based ashore, three on ENEWAK Island at BIKINI Atoll, three on ENIWETOK Island at ENIWETOK Atoll, except during BIKINI shot periods when BIKINI fighters will be operated from BAIROKO.

20. To permit shore-base operations at night, CTG 7.3 in November 1953, requested CJTF SEVEN to effect the lighting of ENEWAK airstrip.

[redacted]

[redacted]

III

21. At BIKINI the BAIROKO will control the fighter aircraft; at ENIWETOK one of the security DDE's will exercise fighter control, assisted by a Navy liaison officer on duty in CTG 7.4 Air Operations Center on ENIWETOK Island. This officer will also assist the BIKINI operation by providing information to BAIROKO on the movements of friendly aircraft in the area

[redacted]

[redacted]

III

d. LOGISTICAL

AVIATION SUPPLY

1. On 24 December 1953, it was learned that HMR-362, the U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter squadron designated to participate in CASTLE, had been unable to obtain six new tail rotors required for their aircraft. The squadron, based at MCAS, El Mirmar, California, was scheduled to move aboard USS BAIROKO in San Diego 4 January 1954. The tail rotors in six of their HRS-2 aircraft required replacement prior to that date.

2. Production had been stopped on the type rotor needed, and replacements were in very short supply. At the request of CTG 7.3, the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia; Commander, Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and Commander, Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet screened the entire aviation supply system. Three rotors in ready for issue condition, and three requiring emergency overhaul, were located at east coast naval and Marine Corps aviation activities. They were shipped by air to the west coast, NAS San Diego overhauled the three rotors requiring repair, and all six were delivered to HMR 362 in time for installation prior to the squadron's deployment date.

[redacted]

[redacted]

III

a. COMMUNICATIONS

USS ESTES (AGC-12)

1. Operation TIGHTCAT was conducted off San Diego in mid-October 1953, with Maj Gen P. W. Clarkson, CJTF SEVEN; Brig Gen H. H. Estes, Jr., CTG 7.4; and RADM H. C. Bruton, CTG 7.3, embarked in ESTES. Participating, in addition to ESTES, were sixteen Air Force aircraft of various types, operating temporarily out of NAS, San Diego. The operation simulated a CASTLE shot, following shot time procedures, with San Nicolas Island representing ENIU at BIKINI Atoll. The results of the tests conducted again emphasized that VHF and direction finder antenna needed relocating, and pointed out the need for thoroughly checking out all VHF receivers and transmitters.

2. Subsequently, the following was accomplished on ESTES:

a. Installment of one additional multi-plex equipment (multiple teletype channel) as a spare for the one already installed.

b. Installment of one additional VHF equipment. Additional VHF units were procured for use as immediate replacements in the event of failures.

c. Installment of VHF ciphony equipment (ESTES-ENIU scrambled Top Secret voice circuit)

d. Installation of one additional AN/TRC-3 equipment. The number of telephone switchboard positions was also increased from four to eight. (trunk-lines)

[redacted]

e. Relocation of VHF, AN/TRC and direction finder antenna for optimum performance.

f. Testing and calibration of all equipment after installation had been completed.

3. A second test was conducted in mid-December 1953, and proved very satisfactory with the exception that five of the eight VHF receivers were not then in optimum operating condition.

4. In January 1954, SIGCT-CANSCA equipment (CJTF SEVEN teletype circuit crypto device, ESTES to [redacted]) was installed in ESTES.

5. Personnel were ordered to various points for training in the use and maintenance of new equipment. An officer and seventeen men of ESTES ship's company were ordered to TAD with CTG 7.2 on [redacted] for the month preceding ESTES scheduled arrival there, for familiarization and special training on circuits that would be jointly operated by CTG 7.2 and ESTES. ESTES operating and maintenance personnel have been augmented for CASTLE by the assignment of approximately eight electronics technicians, ten radiomen, and three telemen in addition to her normal personnel allowance, plus a U.S. Marine Corps signal detachment of two officers and fifteen men.

6. ESTES sailed from San Diego 18 January 1954, fully ready to accomplish her CASTLE communications mission

III

TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS ASHORE

7. CTG 7.3 Administration, (CAPT Rutherford, Chief of Staff) arrived on PALM Island 12 January 1954, accompanied by a portion of the staff, and opened CTG 7.3 temporary headquarters ashore. In the next several days equipment to provide CTG 7.3 the necessary communications facility was installed. The station was activated 14 January 1954, except for some high frequency receivers which had not been received. Replacement receivers were requisitioned from Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet on an emergency basis and were received and installed on 22 January 1954. Current average daily traffic for this station is 135 messages sent and received.

8. Earlier plans for construction of a visual signal tower on PALM Island have been cancelled, since only a few Task Group ships will normally be present at ENIWETOK, and since CTG 7.3 plans to move afloat prior to the first shot.

9. Staff communications personnel have been augmented by the assignment of five Boat Pool radiomen, and an assistant Communication Officer on TAD from ESTES. It is planned to bring three additional radiomen ashore from ESTES after her arrival in the forward area. ESTES personnel will be returned aboard when CTG 7.3 goes afloat.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CIRCUITS IN FORWARD AREA

10. In general Task Group circuits have been successfully established in accordance with plans. Only one is not operating at the present time: USS BAIROKO has not succeeded in establishing the off line SIGTOT teletype circuit with TG 7.2 on ENIWETOK. Some circuits with

Task Group 7.4 have not been fully activated due to Air Force transmitter difficulties. Successful operation of AN/TRC circuits with [redacted] has been delayed pending installation thereby Task Group 7.2 of non-directional antennae.

11. The installation of 42 VRC-10 and 3 VRC-18 radios in ships and boats of the Task Group, for Boat Pool operations, has been essentially completed.

12. In order to provide machine cryptographic systems to expedite traffic delivery and reduce the crypto workload, the cryptographic allowances for all ships except the USNS SGT. [redacted] C. AINSWORTH, YAG-39 and YAG-40 have been raised to class 3 afloat allowances.

f. COMPTROLLER

1. Although the last three weeks of this period cover the operational phase, the majority of the costs were incurred during the build-up phase. These costs were based on outfitting and procurement of special items and continue on the same trend as established during the preceding period.

2. A detailed report of these expenditures for the period ending 31 January 1954 is contained in Section IV.

PERTINENT STATISTICAL MATERIAL

CUMULATIVE COSTS OF TASK GROUP 7.3 FROM 1 JAN 1953 TO 31 JAN 1954

Travel and Per Diem	$5,927.00
Telephone and Utilities	3,000.00
Military Pay	645,290.00
Office Supplies	1,625.00
Alteration of Ships	75,200.00
Radiological Defense	11,600.00
Land Improvement	4,500.00
Buoy Project (Coast Guard)	12,000.00
Documentary Photography	2,700.00
Transportation of Baggage	300.00
Total:	$762,142.00

STATUS OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS BOAT POOL OUTFITTING ALLOTMENT HELD BY SUPPLY OFFICER, U.S. NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS BASE, CORONADO, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1953. - ALLOTMENT NUMBER 44002

Received	$165,000.00
Obligated	69,154.61
Expended	87,149.45
Unobligated Balance	8,695.45

Note: This allotment will be reported to CJTF SEVEN by BUSHIPS and is not reflected in CTG 7.3 Cost Report.

CUMULATIVE COSTS OF TASK GROUP 7.3 FROM 1 OCT 1953 - 31 JAN 1954

Travel and Per Diem	$1,977.00
Telephone and Utilities	1,541.00
Military Pay x	208,493.00
Office Supplies	245.00
Alteration of Ships	46,000.00
Radiological Defense	11,600.00
Land Improvement	4,500.00
Buoy Project (Coast Guard)	12,000.00
Documentary Photography	2,700.00
Transportation of Baggage	800.00
	$289,356.00

x Includes pay of Task Group 7.3 Boat Pool and Underwater Detection Unit.

Note: The above report does not reflect costs for the month of January 1954 of all ships and units attached to Task Group 7.3. Their reports for January 1954 are not due until 25 February 1954.

[redacted]

STATUS OF ALLOTMENTS RECEIVED FROM JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN AS OF 31 JANUARY 1954

ARMY APPROPRIATION 2142020 FY CA 1954

DESCRIPTION	RECEIVED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	UNOBLIGATED
Travel	$46,000.	$24,842.	$5,927.	$21,158.
Transportation of Things	500.	300.	--	200.
Communications	2,000.	--	--	2,000.
Task Group Overhead	400.	--	--	400.
Modification of Ships	85,200.	85,200.	80,200.	--
Land Improvement	4,500.	4,500.	--	--
Documentary Photography	3,000.	2,700.	--	300.
Radiological Defense	12,000.	11,600.	9,600.	400.
Buoy Project (Coast Guard)	12,000.	12,000.	12,000.	--
Totals:	$165,600.	$141,142.	$107,727.	$24,458.

STATUS OF BUSINESS FUNDS ALLOTMENT NUMBER 42299/54 R ID BY THE SUPPLY OFFICER, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) AS OF 31 JANUARY 1954.

Received	$1,000.
Expended	450.
Balance on Hand	550.

[redacted]

[redacted]

STAFF TRAVEL ON TASK FORCE BUSINESS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 24 JANUARY 1954

DATE	OFFICER	DESTINATION		
		WEST COAST	PEARL HARBOR	FORWARD AREA
10-1-53	LCU BOAT OFFICER	X		
10-17-53	ASST OPERATIONS OFFICER (AIR)	X		
10-20-53	CTG 7.3		X	
10-20-53	OPERATIONS OFFICER		X	
10-25-53	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER	X		
11-1-53	ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER	X		
11-3-53	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER			X
11-16-53	LOGISTICS OFFICER	X		
11-16-53	ASST ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER	X		
11-22-53	ASST OPERATIONS OFFICER (AIR)	X		
11-30-53	CHIEF OF STAFF			X
12-9-53	INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY OFFICER	X		
1-4-54	ASST COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER	X		
1-8-54	CTG 7.3			X
1-8-54	CHIEF OF STAFF			X
1-8-54	OPERATIONS OFFICER			X
1-8-54	LOGISTICS OFFICER			X
1-8-54	ASST OPERATIONS OFFICER (AIR)			X
1-8-54	SUPPLY OFFICER			X
1-8-54	INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY OFFICER			X
1-8-54	ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER			X
1-8-54	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER			X
1-8-54	FLAG SECRETARY			X
1-8-54	MEDICAL OFFICER			X
1-8-54	ASST ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER			X
1-8-54	FLAG LIEUTENANT			X
1-8-54	ASST ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER			X
1-8-54	ASST COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER			X
1-8-54	PERSONNEL OFFICER			X
1-12-54	ASST COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER			X

[redacted]

PERSONNEL CLEARANCE STATUS OF SHIPS AND UNITS OF TASK GROUP 7.3 AS OF 24 JANUARY 1954

SHIPS	NAC GRANTED	NAC PENDING	NAC COMPLETED	NAC PENDING	TOTAL
USS BAIROKO	1	76	754	78	909
USS LSTS3	74	68	449	81	672
USS BELLE GROVE	24	16	293	24	357
CORCORTDESDIV TWELVE	3	1	3	0	7
USS PATTERSON	11	3	264	21	299
USS NICHOLAS	12	4	234	35	285
USS HENSHAW	8	2	246	0	256
USS PHILLIP	9	5	237	29	280
USS MOLALA	2	18	63	5	88
USS TAWAKONI	0	13	24	46	83
USS COCOPA	0	10	52	18	80
PATRON THIRTY-NINE	0	6	329	66	401
YAG 40	4	17	24	6	51
YAG 39	8	12	25	6	51
USS CURTISS	52	21	516	55	644
USS GYPSY	4	6	56	3	69
USS SIOUX	6	5	69	3	83
USS LST 762	19	15	88	0	122
USS LST 551	6	15	86	2	109
USS YC 1546	0	8	20	31	59
HMS 562	28	26	61	4	119
TG 7.3 BOAT POOL	9	11	14	0	34
TG 7.3 UDU	17	5	0	0	22
TG 7.3 STAFF	33	1	0	0	34
TOTALS:	330	364	3,907	513	5,114

Personnel clearance status reports have not yet been received from the following ships:

USS APACHE (enroute from WestPac)