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Field Manager, Eniwetok Field Office

James E. Reeves, Commander, TG 7.5

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I/1991

STAFF MEETING - TASK FORCE SEVEN

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C. SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

SYMBOL: T-1

On the morning of June 16, 1953, General Clarkson called a meeting of the staff and Task Group Commanders at his office in Honolulu. Present at the meeting were: Maj. Gen. Clarkson, Commander, JTF SEVEN; Dr. Graves, Scientific Deputy; Rear Adm. H. C. Bruton, Commander, TG 7.3; Brig. Gen. H. M. Estes, Commander, TG 7.4; Capt. W. L. Knickerbocker; Col. W. S. Cowart; Cmdr. J. L. Hall; Col. D. C. Eyars, Jr.; Col. M. A. Ewyater; Col. S. P. Walker, Jr.; Col. Earl Kiesling; Dr. P. L. Amott, and Reeves.

General Clarkson discussed certain of the comments which were made by TG 7.1 and 7.5 on the draft of the Interim Operations Order of JTF SEVEN.

1. He informed the meeting that they would incorporate in each of the functions of Task Groups 7.2 to 7.5 a statement to the effect that a major function of these groups was the support of 7.1.

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2. He pointed out that the quartering problem, both ashore and afloat, was of major concern. Indications were that the contemplated staffing by the various Task Groups was going to exceed the available space. He encouraged all Task Force Commanders to review their requirements critically with a view to decreasing their personnel. He advised that one additional transport was being held in abeyance and might be available if absolutely needed. He pointed out that the cost of this transport would run over \$6,000 per day during the period that it was assigned to the Task Force.

3. He made a point to the effect that the Task Force would determine the military requirements on the basis of information furnished by 7.1 as to what had to be accomplished rather than having 7.1 place a requirement on the Task Force for specific services, personnel or equipment by the military.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
1ST REVIEW DATE: 11-01-87
AUTHORITY: 105C BRAD CADD
NAME: [Signature]
2ND REVIEW DATE: 02-14-97
AUTHORITY: ADD
NAME: [Signature]
DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
4. COORDINATE WITH:
5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
7. OTHER (SPECIFY):

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4. He advised that he preferred to operate (dispatch) the boat pool by means of a panel (7.5 and 7.3) as proposed in his draft of the Operations Order rather than to operate as was done during the last operation. He indicated that this was necessitated by the establishment of 7.5. Although his reasoning was not completely clear to me, neither Dr. Graves nor I objected when he requested that we try out the panel. He assured us that he would follow this very closely during the initiation of the operation and that, if there was any indication of failure of the panel to function, he would make immediate changes as might be indicated. He indicated that such changes might be placing the boat pool under the control of 7.5, 7.3, or under one of his staff people.
5. With regard to the dispatching of the helicopters, he advised that this would be in accordance with the draft of the Operations Order rather than the proposal as suggested by both 7.1 and 7.5 in our comments. We were advised by Col. Earl Kiesling that the same group of people, some Navy and some Air Force, would actually be responsible for this dispatching regardless of whether the Command responsibility rested with 7.3 or 7.4.

Inasmuch as Col. Kiesling and Admiral Bruton both felt that this procedure was entirely practical and that there would be no discontinuity in the operations at the time the Command was switched to 7.4 from 7.3, neither Dr. Graves nor I objected.

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6. The General asked that air lift requirements during the month of January be reviewed carefully by the Task Groups with a view toward delaying or advancing the dates of transport on as many people as possible. Christmas complicates this situation.
7. The General explained that because of security reasons he felt very strongly that he was going to have to insist that the Signal Corps provide and operate the only communications system between the two atolls. This system would be monitored by a censor who would be in a position to disconnect the communication at any time.

Dr. Graves expressed grave doubt as to the advisability of depending upon a single system for the communications and strongly recommended that we proceed with our contemplated

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installation of a coded teletype system by EG&G. He also expressed doubt as to the practicability of maintaining security by monitoring direct conversations. After considerable discussion as to the relative security merits of the two systems and the need of a second system to guarantee service, in which we were supported to a considerable extent by both Admiral Bruton and General Estes, the meeting was closed without any decision being reached.

Following the meeting, I discussed the communications problem with Dr. Graves and pointed out that in my opinion it would be very desirable to have the EG&G system left intact following the operation and turned over to Holmes & Narver for their use during the interim periods. Later, I was advised separately by Dr. Graves and General Clarkson that General Clarkson had agreed with us to proceed with the installation of the system by EG&G. I was under the impression, however, that he was reserving decision as to whether we would be permitted to operate it unless the Signal Corps system failed or proved inadequate.

CC: ~~Graves, J-Div, LASL~~
Curry, LASL
McCraw, Security
E&C

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